

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY PANAMA

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EXDIS FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER FROM KARINSHAK

FOLTEL RPTD FOR YOUR INFO

SENT ACTION ISLAMABAD KABUL INFO ALGIERS AMMAN BEIRUT BONN CAIRO

DAMASCUS JIDDA KHARTOUM KUWAIT LONDON MOSCOW PARIS RABAT ROME TEHRAN

TRIPOLI TUNIS USUN ABU DHABI BAGHDAD MANAMA MUSCAT DOHA FM SECSTATE

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EXDIS TOSEC 451

E.O. 11652:GDS NO FOREIGN DISSEM

TAGS: PFOR, XF, MO

SUBJECT: END OF RABAT SUMMIT INDICATES ARAB-ISRAELI

CONTROVERSY ENTERS NEW PHASE

1. FOLLOWING IS INR ANALYSIS OF SOME OF THE LONGER-RANGE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE RABAT SUMMIT DECISIONS FOR THE ARABS
AN ISRAEL.

2. THREE RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT DELIBERATIONS WARRANT PAR-
TICULAR ATTENTION:

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--(A) WEST BANK. ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FUTURE
OF THIS AREA HAVE BEEN RULED OUT UNLESS UNTIL ISRAEL
RECOGNIZES THE PLO. THE JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE BETWEEN
JORDAN AND THE PLO HAS BEEN RESOLVED IN THE PLO'S FAVOR.

PALESTINE NOW JOINS THE RANK OF THE "CONFRONTATION STATES." HUSAYN HAS RENOUNCED THE CLAIM TO THE TERRITORY SEIZED BY 'ABDALLAH WITH BRITISH HELP IN 1948, LEAVING THE PLO AS THE ONLY HEIR TO ANY PART OF PALESTINE RECOVERED FROM ISRAEL. IN RETURN, 'ARAFAT HAS AGREED TO HOLD DISCUSSION WITH HUSAYN IN QUADRIPARTITE FORUMS--ALTHOUGH THIS ARRANGEMENT HARBORS NUMEROUS PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS THAT HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY NOT BEEN FACED UP TO. THERE ARE CONFLICTING REPORTS AS TO WHETHER 'ARAFAT AND HUSAYN ARE TO MEET IN AMMAN OR ALGIERS, AND ALONE, OR ALONG WITH EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS--AND WHEN.

--(B) NEGOTIATING MODALITIES NOT DEALT WITH. EXCEPT FOR IRAQ AND LIBYA, WHO REJECT ANY RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL, THE ARAB LEAGUE IS STILL ON THE NEGOTIATING TRACK. HOWEVER, THE SUMMIT ISSUED NO PRESCRIPTION FOR THE TIME, PLACE, AND AGENDA OF THE NEXT ROUND IN THE NEGOTIATIONS--APPARENTLY PREFERRING TO LEAVE THESE QUESTIONS TO THE CONFRONTATION STATES, WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO HOLD THEIR OWN SUMMIT SOON.

--(C) FURTHER PREPARATION FOR WAR. ACCORDING TO UNOFFICIAL REPORTS, ALL THE ARAB OIL STATES EXCEPT IRAQ AND LIBYA HAVE AGREED OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING ANNUAL PAYMENTS (AMOUNTS FOR EGYPT AND SYRIA SEEM FIRM, BUT THOSE FOR THE OTHERS ARE IN DOUBT): EGYPT-ONE BILLION DOLS; SYRIA-ONE BILLION DOLS; JORDAN-250 MILLION DOLS; PLO-50 MILLION DOLS. SOUTH YEMEN IS ALSO TO RECEIVE 150 MILLION DOLS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF A BASE ON PERIM ISLAND AND THE 99-YEAR LEASE THEREOF TO THE ARAB LEAGUE. (EGYPT HAS BEEN SHOWING INTEREST IN GARRISONING THIS ISLAND, UNDOUBTEDLY IN ORDER TO INTERDICT MARITIME TRAFFIC TO ISRAEL IN THE EVENT OF RENEWED HOSTILITIES.)

3. PERIOD OF ADJUSTMENT FOR JORDAN. AT SOME POINT, JORDAN WILL HAVE TO FACE UP TO THE LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
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OF THE RABAT DECISION: REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION, REORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO ELIMINATE THE WEST BANK SEATS, AND DETERMINATION OF THE NATIONALITY OF PALESTINIAN SUBJECTS. WHILE MANY JORDANIANS OF WEST BANK ORIGIN ARE FULLY ASSIMILATED, THERE MAY BE AS MANY AS 400,000 WHO WOULD GO BACK TO PALESTINE IF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED ITSELF. IF HUSAYN WERE TO WASH HIS HANDS OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AND CONCENTRATE ON BUILDING A STATE ON THE EAST BANK, HE WOULD GRATIFY MANY OF HIS BEDOUIN SUBJECTS. HAVING ABANDONED ITS CLAIM TO THE WEST BANK, JORDAN HAS NO FURTHER LEGAL RATIONALE FOR PAYING SUBSIDIES TO WEST BANK MUNICIPALITIES AND SALARIES TO SEVERAL THOUSAND

WEST BANK CIVIL SERVANTS. HOWEVER, HE IS NOT YET READY TO MAKE THIS BREAK. ON OCTOBER 30 HE REPORTEDLY ANNOUNCED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE AID AND SERVICES" TO THE WEST BANK. IT WOULD PROBABLY BE POLITICALLY INADVISABLE IN ANY EVENT TO PENALIZE THE WEST BANKERS BY CLOSING THE BRIDGES.

4. EVEN IF HUSAYN SHOULD MAKE A CLEAN BREAK WITH THE WEST BANK, THE OTHER ARAB LEADERS WOULD EXPECT HIM TO STAY ON

THE ARAB TEAM. IN ORDER TO QUALIFY FOR HIS NEW ARAB LEAGUE SUBSIDY (WHICH PROMISES TO EXCEED PRESENT SUBSIDIES FROM SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, AND THE US), HE WILL HAVE TO PARTICIPATE IN ARAB DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES AND ARAB MILITARY PLANNING AGAINST ISRAEL.

5. NEXT MOVE FOR THE PLO. IN RETURN FOR ARAB LEAGUE ENDORSEMENT OF ITS CLAIM TO THE WEST BANK, THE PLO VOTED WITH THE RABAT MAJORITY FOR CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATING EFFORT WITH ISRAEL. THE OCTOBER 26 NEW YORK TIMES QUOTED A MEMBER OF THE PLO'S RABAT DELEGATION AS SAYING: "WITH THE KIND OF SUPPORT WE GOT HERE AND A STRONG RESOLUTION IN (THE UNGA), WE CAN GO TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OR ANY PLACE WHERE A MIAS SETTLEMENT IS DISCUSSED." WITH 'ARAFAT RIDING A WAVE OF POLITICAL SUCCESSES, HE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE SERIOUSLY THREATENED BY THE REJECTIONISTS, DESPITE THE OCTOBER 30 DENUNCIATION OF HIS POLICIES BY THE PFLP, ALF, PSF, AND GENERAL COMMAND.

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THERE SEEMS TO BE NO REMAINING OBSTACLE TO EARLY PROCLAMATION OF A GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE EXCEPT THE ENDEMIC RISK OF FACTIONAL RIVALRIES WITHIN 'ARAFAT'S OWN ORGANIZATION. ALTHOUGH BEIRUT IS THE MOST CONVENIENT SITE, THE PLO MAY HAVE TO SETTLE ON CAIRO OUT OF DEFERENCE TO EGYPT AND THE ARAB LEAGUE.

6. SHOULD JORDAN SUSPEND THE SALARIES OF WEST BANK CIVIL SERVANTS, THE PLO'S NEW LEGITIMACY WOULD CONFRONT IT WITH TWO TRICKY PROBLEMS: A) SHOULD IT TAKE OVER THIS RESPONSIBILITY, ON THE STRENGTH OF ITS NEW STIPEND FROM ARAB LEAGUE? B) IF SO, HOW COULD IT MAKE THE PAYMENTS IN THE FACE OF EXPECTED ISRAELI OPPOSITION?

7. HARD DECISIONS FOR SADAT. HUSAYN FELT LET DOWN AT RABAT BY SADAT, WHO SEEMS TO HAVE GIVEN UP WITHOUT A FIGHT TO THE PLO AND SYRIA. SADAT'S DIFFIDENCE UNDOUBTEDLY REFLECTED GROWING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TROUBLES AT HOME. THE OBVERSE OF HIS SHIFT TOWARD WASHINGTON WAS ESTRANGEMENT FROM MOSCOW. NOW HE IS UNDER PRESSURE FROM HIS MILITARY TO NEGOTIATE THE RESUMPTION OF SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS. CONGRESSIONAL INACTION ON THE

250 MILLION DOLS AID PROPOSAL AND ISRAEL'S TOUGH NEGOTIATING LINE HAVE FURTHER WEAKENED HIS POSITION. THE RABAT DECISIONS ADDED TO THE URGENCY BY INCREASING THE-RVSK OF NEW HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL. THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN A PRO-SOVIET SHIFT IN STATEMENTS BY EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS AND COMMENTS IN EGYPTIAN MEDIA--WITHOUT ANY STEP-UP IN THE ARMS FLOW. THE SOVIETS MAY TRY TO FORCE SADAT TO DISTANCE HIMSELF FURTHER FROM THE US.

8. THE LONG SAUDI SHADOW. ALTHOUGH FAYSAL PLAYED HIS USUAL QUIET HAND AT RABAT, WE INFER THAT HE USED HIS NEW POSITION AS A SIGNIFICANT FORCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE TO ASSERT A DOMINANT INFLUENCE. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE THAT THE SUMMIT'S PRONOUNCEMENT ON THE WEST BANK WAS THE PRODUCT OF FAYSAL'S CONCLUSION THAT THE PLO-JORDANIAN DISPUTE HAD DRAGGED ON LONG ENOUGH. IF THIS READING IS ACCURATE, IT BECOMES IMPORTANT TO DETERMINE FAYSAL'S TIMETABLE FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

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9. SYRIAN CONCERNS. ALWAYS READY TO SUSPECT EGYPT OF BAD FAITH, SYRIA USED THE RABAT MEETING AS A FORUM TO SOW DOUBTS ABOUT THE POLICY OF COOPERATION WITH THE US AND TO PROMOTE ARAB PREPAREDNESS FOR ANOTHER ROUND WITH ISRAEL. STILL, THERE IS NO SIGN OF SYRIAN DESIRE TO GO TO WAR TOMORROW. SOME MORE GIVE IN THE ISRAELI POSITION ON GOLAN WOULD PROBABLY KEEP DAMASCUS ON THE NEGOTIATING TRACK.

10. ISRAELI CONCERNS. THE ISRAELIS HAVE CONDEMNED A WEST BANK STATE IN ADVANCE AS IRREDENTIST, NONVIALE, AND PREY TO TERRORIST AND SOVIET INFLUENCE. THIS APPRAISAL APPEARS OVERDRAWN. A PALESTINIAN STATE WOULD BE NO LESS VIALE AND NO MORE VULNERABLE TO SOVIET CONTROL THAN ANY OTHER OF THE POORER ARAB STATES. AS AN OBVIOUS TARGET OF ISRAELI RETALIATION, IT WOULD HAVE A STRONG INTEREST IN REPRESSING TERRORIST OPERATIONS FROM ITS TERRITORY.

11. HOWEVER, A PALESTINIAN STATE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE IRREDENTIST. NO SUCCESSFUL PALESTINIAN POLITICIAN CAN ABANDON THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF A SECULAR PALESTINE. NOR COULD THE PLO ACCEPT "DEMILITARIZATION," WHICH IN THE ISRAELI DEFINITION MEANS THE PRESERVATION OF ISRAEL'S MILITARY HEGEMONY. AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINE ON THE WEST BANK WOULD FRUSTRATE DREAMS OF SETTLEMENT IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA, PLACE ARAB FORCES WITHIN GUNSHOT OF JERUSALEM, EXERT A STRONG PULL ON 400,000 ARAB ISRAELIS, AND MIGHT WELL POSE A GREATER SECURITY THREAT TO ISRAEL THAN WOULD THE REESTABLISHMENT OF JORDANIAN RULE. WITH A PALESTINIAN STATE NEXT DOOR, THE THREAT OF AN ARAB

FIFTH COLUMN IN ISRAEL WOULD BE INTENSIFIED. CONSEQUENTLY, ISRAEL IS MOST UNLIKELY TO RECOGNIZE THE PLO EXCEPT UNDER EXTREME US PRESSURE.

12. ISRAELI OPTIONS. ISRAEL COULD NOW CONCLUDE THAT THE RABAT DECISION HAS EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATED THE WEST BANK AS A SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATION AND THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO REGULARIZE ITS ADMINISTRATION. HOWEVER, ISRAEL'S OPTIONS ARE LIMITED. ANNEXATION OF THE WEST BANK AND
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AWARDING CITIZENSHIP TO ANOTHER 700,000 ARABS WOULD PROBABLY BE SEEN AS UNACCEPTABLE DILUTION OF THE CHARACTER OF THE ISRAELI STATE. (ANNEXATION OF THE GAZA

STRIP MIGHT BE MANAGEABLE, PARTICULARLY IF ITS REFUGEE POPULATION COULD BE MOVED TO THE WEST BANK.) ANY ATTEMPT TO SET UP AN INDIGENOUS LOCAL GOVERNMENT ON THE WEST BANK WOULD PROBABLY FAIL, IF ONLY FOR LACK OF PALESTINIANS WILLING TO PARTICIPATE.

13. THUS, ISRAEL MAY DECIDE TO KEEP THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENT, WITH OCCUPIED PALESTINE REMAINING UNDER MILITARY RULE, ARAB OFFICIALS ONLY AT THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL, AND

EVEN THOSE FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES DEPENDENT ON THE ISRAELI CIVIL SERVICE. IN TIME ISRAEL MAY MOVE TO ARABIZE THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION, BUT OTHERWISE IT SEEMS TO HAVE LITTLE ROOM FOR MANEUVER AS LONG AS THE WEST BANKERS STAY IN PLACE.

14. PEACE OR WAR? THE SUMMIT SEEMS TO SIGNAL A PHASE OF GREATER ARAB MILITANCY. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THE ARABS HAVE CONCLUDED THAT JORDAN'S STRONGEST ARGUMENT IN THE WEST BANK DISPUTE--ISRAELI READINESS TO DEAL WITH IT--IS WORTHLESS IN VIEW OF ISRAEL'S DETERMINATION TO RETAIN ULTIMATE CONTROL OF THE WEST BANK IN ANY CASE. ACCORDING TO TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES, HUSAYN WAS HIMSELF DISILLUSIONED BY THE "HUMILIATING" COUNTERPROPOSAL THAT WAS MADE TO HIS OWN PLAN FOR DISENGAGEMENT ALONG THE JORDAN RIVER. THE ARABS APPEAR TO HAVE CONCLUDED THAT ISRAEL'S MINIMUM SECURITY DEMANDS MAKE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT A LONG SHOT, AND THAT THEIR GROWING MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POWER MAKE WAR A REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE. THEY HAVE OSTENSIBLY REAFFIRMED THE BASIC STRATEGY OF PURSUING THE NEGOTIATIONS WHILE PREPARING FOR WAR--BUT WITH MORE EMPHASIS THAN BEFORE ON THE SECOND HALF OF THAT FORMULA. THE GRADUALISTS AMONG THE ARABS ARE ON THE DEFENSIVE, AND SUPPORT IS BUILDING FOR THE SYRIAN-SOVIET FORMULA FOR OVERALL NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA--OR, FAILING THAT, FOR A RETURN TO THE TACTICS OF OCTOBER 1973.

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15. IF THIS TREND IS TO BE REVERSED, THE ARABS WILL REQUIRE EARLY PROGRESS ON THE NEGOTIATING FRONT. EVEN IF THE RABAT DECISIONS ELIMINATED THE WEST BANK FROM PRESENT CONSIDERATION, THEY DO NOT APPEAR TO PRECLUDE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE OTHER BORDERS. SINAI STILL OFFERS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR EARLY ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT PROVIDED THAT SADAT CAN OBTAIN A GREEN LIGHT FROM HIS ALLIES. WITH THE PLO TEMPORARILY APPEASED, THE WAY MAY STILL BE OPEN TO SECOND-STAGE SINAI AND GOLAN DISENGAGEMENTS. INGERSOLL

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